Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 12

Spring 4-1-2000

FERRILL V. PARKER GROUP, INC. 168 F.3D 468 (11TH CIR.1999)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj

Recommended Citation
FERRILL V. PARKER GROUP, INC. 168 F.3D 468 (11TH CIR.1999), 6 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J.
165 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol6/iss1/12

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington
and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
christensena@wlu.edu.

FERRILL V. PARKER GROUP, INC.
168 F.3D 468 (11TH CIR.1999)
FACTS
The Parker Group, Inc. ("TPG") is a telephone marketing corporation.'
In the weeks prior to elections, TPG hires temporary employees to make "getout-the-vote" calls for political candidates. 2 Ten percent of these calls consist
of race-matched calling meaning black employees call black voters using a
"black" script, while white employees call white voters using a "white"
script.3 The black scripts were written to incite hostility toward the opposing
candidates by emphasizing racial issues.' TPG utilized this strategy based on
the underlying rationale that "black voters will more readily identify with and
be more sympathetic to 'black voices' whereas white voters will more readily
identify with and be sympathetic to 'white voices'." 5 TPG only employs this
voice-matched strategy when its customers requested race-matched or regional
also
dialect-matched calling.6 In an effort to facilitate supervision, TPG
7
calling.
race-matched
in
engaged
employees
segregated
physically
From September through November of 1994, a temporary agency placed
Shirley Ferrill ("Ferrill") at TPG to fill its pre-election staffing needs.' TPG
assigned Ferrill, a black woman without a discernable accent, to a racematched "get-out-the-vote" project.' On several occasions, Ferrill complained
to TPG about being segregated by race and the condescension in the black
scripts.'o
Following the election, TPG's business decreased by ninety percent."
Consequently, TPG laid off Ferrill and several other temporary callers in a
foreseeable reduction-in-force.' 2 Shortly thereafter, Ferrill filed an action
against TPG in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama. Ferrill alleged that TPG racially discriminated against her in both

1. Ferril v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 471 (11 th Cir. 1999).
v. Parker Group, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 472, 473 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
2. Ferrili
3. Ferrill,168 F.3d at 471.

4. Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1331, 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
5. Ferrill, 967 F. Supp. at 474.

6. 967 F. Supp. at 474.
7. 168 F.3d at 471.
8. Id.

9. Ferrill,985 F. Supp. at 1332.
10. 985 F. Supp. at 1333.
11. 967 F. Supp. at 473.
12.

Id.
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her termination and her job assignment under 42 U.S.C. § 198 1.'" Section
1981 prohibits intentional discriminatory conduct that interferes with the
terms and conditions of an employment contract. 14
To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under § 1981,
an employee must show direct evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of
race.' 5 When circumstantial evidence is utilized to prove discriminatory
discharge, the court employs the McDonnell Douglas6 burden shifting
analysis. This requires the plaintiff to show:
(1)
that she is a member of a protected minority; (2) that she was qualified
for the job from which she was discharged; (3)that she was discharged; and
(4) that her position was filled by a non-minority or deliberately not filled.' 7
Once the employee has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision.'"
Both Ferrill and TPG filed motions for summary judgment.' 9 Ferrill's
motion was granted in part, and TPG's motion was granted in part.20 With
respect to Ferrill's unlawful termination claim, the district court found that
Ferrill failed to show her position was deliberately not filled or filled by a
non-minority.2 ' Ferrill also failed to rebut TPG's nondiscriminatory reason
for her termination.22 According to TPG, Ferrill's termination was the result
of a "reduction-in-force" following the election.23 The district court noted
that Ferrill failed to "adduce any evidence that her position did anything,
except evaporate." The court granted TPG's motion for summary judgment
on Ferrill's unlawful termination claim.2"
13. Id. at 474.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 states: "[all persons within thejurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ...as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Ferrill was prohibited from suing TPG under 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et. seq. ("Title VII") because the temporary
agency was her actual employer not TPG. Id. at 471 n.4. The difference between Title VII and Section
1981 claims are that Section 1981 claims can only be proven by direct evidence of disparate treatment,
while Title VII claims can be proven by disparate treatment or disparate impact.
15. Id.
16. 411 U.S. 792(1973).
17. 967 F. Supp. at 474 (quoting Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11 th
Cir. 1995)).
18. 967 F. Supp. at 475
19. Id. at 473.
20. Id. at 475.
21. Id. at 474.
22. Id. at 475.
23, Id. at 473.
24. Id. at 474.
25. Id. at 472.
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In analyzing Ferrill's unlawful assignment claim, the district court found
no evidence that TPG was acting with any racial animus.2 6 However, the court
found TPG liable as a matter of law based on its racial segregation and
disparate treatment in the workplace. 27 The district court acknowledged:
It is well established that assignment of job duties based solely on race
violates Title VII, and accordingly § 1981... even where the discriminatory
assignment is benign or well intentioned. Employers are forbidden by §
1981, and the other relevant employment discrimination statutes, from
assigning work based on stereotyped assumptions, even if real world
exigencies make such stereotyping politically desirable .. "
The court also criticized the political candidates who used the telephone
solicitation for requesting "such an obvious violation of the law. ' 29
After granting Ferrill' s motion for summary judgment on her unlawful job
assignment claim, the district court submitted the question of damages to the
jury.3" The jury awarded Ferrill $500 in compensatory damages, and $4,000
in punitive damages.3 TPG renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of
law.3 2 Alternatively, TPG filed for an amendment to the judgment for a
remittitur or for a new trial.33
The district court determined that Ferrill's testimony provided sufficient
evidence for ajury to award $500 for her mental anguish.34 The district court
also found that the $4,000 award for punitive damages was not excessive.35
TPG appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals claiming that the
district court erroneously granted partial summaryjudgment for Ferrill on her
unlawful job assignment claim because the district court did not find any
evidence of racial animus.36 TPG also appealed the jury's award of
compensatory and punitive damages.37

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 475.
985 F. Supp. at 1332.
967 F. Supp. at 475.
Id.
985 F. Supp. at 1332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld. at 1333.
Id. at 1334.
168 F.3dat471.

37. Id.
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HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding that TPG violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981.38 The Eleventh
Circuit held that TPG intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in
assigning jobs.3 9 The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the jury's compensatory
damage award,' holding that punitive 4damages are inappropriate in the
absence of either malice or recklessness. '
ANALYSIS
Ferrill based her prima facie case on TPG's stipulations in the Pretrial
Order that call assignments and scripts were based on the employee's race and
that employees were physically separated according to race.42 The appellate
court affirmed the district court's finding that TPG intentionally discriminated
based on TPG's admission of "disparate treatment on the basis of race."43
Relying on Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.," the Eleventh Circuit found
that a defendant is liable under § 1981 without evidence of racial animus, as
long as decisions are based on race.45 In Goodman, Black employees sued
their union under § 1981 for intentionally refusing to assert racial bias claims
against their employer.' The Supreme Court held that the union violated §
1981, even though the record was devoid of any evidence showing racial
animus toward Blacks.47
To determine whether TPG is liable for its intentional discrimination, the
Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether TPG's discrimination fit into one of three
categories of permissible discrimination.48 The first exception is the bona fide
occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense, which originated in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1). 4 9 Title VII asserts, if discrimination on the basis of religion,
38. Id. at 477.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.at472 n.6.
43. ld. at 472.
44. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
45. 967 F. Supp. at 473.
46. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 656.
47. 482 U.S. at 669.
48. 967 F. Supp. at 473.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) provides:
[lt shallnot be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer
for employment any individual, for
a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any
individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
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sex or national origin is necessary to the normal functioning of a business, an
employer may discriminate on those grounds.50 Although Congress discussed
including race and color in the BFOQ exception, Congress specifically
excluded race from the statute thereby disallowing the BFOQ defense for
racial discrimination."1 Consequently, because TPG engaged in racial
discrimination, TPG cannot use the BFOQ defense. 2
Despite the absence of a statutory BFOQ defense for racial discrimination,
the Seventh Circuit created what could be construed as a racial BFOQ defense
in Wittmer v. Peters.53 The Wittrnercourt found that a discriminatory practice
can survive strict "scrutiny only if the defendants show that they are motivated
by a truly powerful and worthy concern and that the racial measure that they
have adopted is a plainly apt response to that concern. 4 The defendants must
show that they had to do something and had no alternative to what they did.
The concern and the response, moreover, must be substantiated and not merely
asserted."5 5 The Seventh Circuit accepted this justification for discrimination
based on expert evidence that black boot camp correctional officers must be
in positions of authority at the camp in order for black inmates to respond to
the harsh regimentation.5 6
Subsequently, in McNanara v. City of Chicago,s' the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged Wittmer'sj ustification.58 However, the court declined to follow
Wittrner because there was little evidence that firehouses with only white
personnel firefighters would lack credibility, and be denied cooperation, in
minority neighborhoods.5 9 The Eleventh Circuit examined the Seventh
Circuit's judicially crafted racial justification, however, they have declined to
create a similar exception.' °
The second exception to the prohibition against discrimination is the
"business necessity" defense, which originated in Griggsv. Duke Power Co.6
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any
individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

168 F.3d at 473.
Id.
Id.
87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
Witmer, 87 F.3d at 918.
87 F.3dat918.
Id. at 920.
138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998).
McNamara, 138 F.3d at 1222.
Id.
168 F.3d. at 475.

61.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J.

[Vol. 6:165

Under this exception, facially neutral employment practices that have a
disparate impact are permitted if the practice has a legitimate, job-related
purpose.62 Accordingly, this defense is not available in a § 1981 claim where
intentional discrimination is an essential element; rather, this defense is
limited to cases involving neutral employment practices. 63 This limitation
precludes TPG from utilizing the business necessity defense, as it had already
6
stipulated to intentionally discriminating on the basis of race.M
The final exception to the bar against discrimination is in a situation
where the alleged discrimination is part of an affirmative action plan to
remedy past discrimination.65 The court of appeals found that assigning Ferrill
to call blacks was not "intended to correct racial imbalance. Rather, it was
based on a racial stereotype that blacks" would respond to other blacks and
"on the premise that [Ferrill's] race was directly related her ability to do the
job."66 Consequently, TPG could not avail itself of this exception.
After affirming that TPG had violated § 1981 by assigning job duties
based on race, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury's award of $500 in
compensatory damages. The court based this on
Ferrill's testimony that the terms, conditions, and privileges of her

employment were adversely affected by TPG's disparate treatment of
employees on the basis of race was sufficient evidence of harm . . .
[specifically] that she was humiliated by TPG's physical separation of
employees on the basis of race and by TPG's allocation of work and scripts
according to race.

67

Specifically, the circuit court noted that Ferrill's "humiliation and insult are
recognized, recoverable harms. ' 68 The circuit court deferred to the findings
of the district court "because the harm is subjective and evaluating it depends
considerably upon the demeanor of the witnesses. ' 69
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit did not uphold the punitive damage award
because "the district court specifically found that TPG lacked any racial

62. 62168 F.3d. at 473.
63. Id. at 474.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) clearly states, "business necessity may not be used as a defense
against a claim of intentional discrimination." Despite this statutory limitation, the Fifth Circuit has
suggested that the business necessity defense may be justified on racial grounds in certain circumstances
such as undercover infiltration or selection of actors. 168 F.3d. at 475.
65. 168 F.3d at 474.
66. Id. (quoting Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 476.
68. Id.

69. Id. (quoting Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 937-38 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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animus7" Punitive damages may be awarded under § 1981 when the
defendant's conduct is motivated by malevolence. 7 Consequently, because
the district court found that TPG acted without malice or reckless indifference,
the district court erred in awarding Ferrill punitive damages. 2
CONCLUSION
The judgment will have a larger impact on employers and employees
beyond political calling. All employers should take heed to the warnings of
this court. The appellate court has made it clear that a plaintiff does not need
to prove racial animus for a defendant to be held liable under § 198 1.7 The
district court noted:
The legal rule in this case might well prevent advertisers from employing,
based on race, actors to solicit products to a certain group... or even prevent
the exclusive hiring of black actors to play such roles as Othello.
Nevertheless, this is the74 state of the law, and this court has found no
authority to the contrary.
This case also has important implications in employment law. This court
makes it clear that a plaintiff does not need to prove racial animosity to
recover compensatory damages in a § 1981 intentional racial discrimination
claim. 75 A lack of evidence of racial hostility has no effect on compensatory
damages for harms, including emotional harms, but it will preclude a punitive
damage award. 76 The Eleventh Circuit explicitly refused to recognize a BFOQ
or business necessity defense for § 1981 defendants."
This decision will impact plaintiffs because they will have to prove only
intentional discrimination to receive compensatory damages regardless of the
defendant's intentions. However, the plaintiff must still prove a malicious
intent to receive punitive damages. This will impact employers because many
long-standing employment techniques need to be abandoned if they are
premised on race.
In this case, TPG readily admitted to making race-based decisions because
the decisions did not involve racial animosity toward blacks. The Eleventh
70. Id. at 477.
71. Id. at 476 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).
72. Id. at 477.

73. Id. at 473.
74. 967 F. Supp. at 475.
75.

168 F.3d. at 473.

76. Id. at 477.
77. Id. at 474.
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Circuit has made it clear that § 1981 does not take into account the employer's
motive for the decisions, only that the decisions were intentionally made on
the basis of race. Thus, the § 1981 defendant does not have many of the
defenses available to those defending against a Title VII claim. Plaintiffs may
want to consider this distinction before filing their complaint.
In the Eleventh Circuit, the BFOQ defense is only available to employers
on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin; race is not an available
defense. The business necessity defense is only available when there is a
showing of disparate impact. The business necessity is unavailable to an
employer defense in a § 1981 case because the courts look for disparate
treatment, not disparate impact. Under the facts of this case, the only defense
available was to prove that the disparate treatment was the result of an
affirmative action plan. The court rejected this argument.
A potential defense for future defendants is to make a free speech
argument. TPG tried to argue that "race-matched calling is political speech
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."7 8 However, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to consider this argument because it was not brought before
the district court.
Another important aspect of this case is the Eleventh Circuit's decision on
damages. The circuit court held that testimony could be used to prove
compensatory damages.79 Additionally, the standard of review for emotional
harms will be deferential to the fact finder. If a "damage award has survived
review by the trial judge, it will be difficult to overturn due to the presumption
of validity."' This eases up the burden on plaintiff by allowing the plaintiff
to use the testimony of the plaintiff or other witnesses to prove damages. This
will also allow plaintiffs to avoid bringing in costly experts. The impact of
this decision is favorable to plaintiffs because they may have been precluded
from a damage award in the past, if their injuries were not damaging enough
to visit a psychologist. It will be less favorable to defendants because it is
very hard to dispute someone's personal assessment of himself or herself.
A § 1981 defendant's motives are relevant only for purposes of the
punitive damage award. The purpose of awarding punitive damages is to
punish the defendant and deter intentional discrimination. Therefore, the
"defendant's conduct must be motivated by an evil intent, or by reckless or
callous indifference to the rights" of their employees.8 ' Social policy mandates
that all decision based on race be punished by punitive damages. Employers

78. 168 F.3dat475.
79. Id. at 476.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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should know that intentionally treating someone different based on their race
is illegal. Unfortunately, employers are unlikely to discontinue discriminatory
practices in light of the court's refusal to implement punitive damage awards
when a plaintiff can not prove a malicious intent.
Realistically, this case will have a limited impact on § 1981 termination
claims. In most discrimination cases, the employer does not openly admit to
making race-based decisions. The biggest burden on plaintiffs is providing
proof of race based employment decisions. In the present case, the employer
was very up front about their decisions due to the belief that they could not be
held liable if their conduct was not motivated by racial animus. Most § 1981
plaintiffs will not be so lucky.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Nakisha S. Sharpe

